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Most American lawyers are familiar with the problems inherent in
applying decades-old laws to modem financial instruments, but none,
perhaps, more so than derivatives lawyers. Derivatives are relatively
modem financial instruments that began to gain widespread use less than
twenty years ago.' Since that time, however, derivatives have evolved
rapidly, forcing lawyers to analyze their legal implications in the context of
statutes and regulatory laws established long before derivatives even came
into existence.2 For example, consider the law applicable to derivative
contracts secured by California real estate. California's real estate security
laws were codified or materially modified to assume their present form in
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Those laws were enacted long
before the advent of financial instruments of the 1990s and 2000s, such as
derivatives.3
* William L. Harvey is a partner at Winston & Strawn LLP, San Francisco. Much of the research
supporting this article was done while the author was a partner at White & Case LLP, San Francisco.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Vince Novak, formerly associated with
White & Case, LLP, and Lindsey Moran, associate at Winston & Strawn LLP, as well as the helpful
editorial and substantive contributions of Mark Guinn, Assistant General Counsel of Bank of America,
and Randy Rogers, partner at Winston & Strawn LLP. The author can be reached at
wharvey@winston.com, and is solely responsible for the views expressed and any errors and omissions.
All rights reserved.
I. See generally ROGER BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE
§§ 2.8 (3d ed. 2005).
2. Examples include various statutes regulating gambling, insurance, and "bucket-shops," and the
Commodity Exchange Act (in the form existing prior to recent amendments and policy statements),
which are perceived (or were perceived) as potentially rendering certain forms of derivatives illegal or
unenforceable. See generally TONY CIRO, DERIVATIVES REGULATION AND LEGAL RISK 16 (2004);
ANTHONY GOOCH & LINDA KLEIN, DOCUMENTATION FOR DERIVATIVES 63-128 (4th ed. 2002).
3. See generally BERNHARDT, supra note 1, §§ 4.1, 4.2. California's one-action rule was adopted in
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Derivatives are financial contracts typically used by business entities
either to hedge certain liability- or asset-linked risks, or to speculate on the
direction of future changes in price or value. Although at one time
derivatives were used mainly by the largest and most creditworthy entities,
such as members of the Fortune 100, today middle-market and even small
start-up concerns and other end-users are choosing to mitigate or reallocate
financial risks arising in the course of their businesses and affairs by using
swaps, options, forwards and other similar derivative arrangements.4
To mitigate the credit risks created under derivative contracts, less
creditworthy entities are sometimes required by their derivatives
counterparties to provide credit support in the form of real or personal
property collateral.' Perhaps the most common instance in which real
property is used as collateral for derivatives trades is in the context of
derivatives used to hedge interest rate risk associated with real estate loans.
Here, the borrower may wish to convert floating to fixed interest rate
exposure, or vice versa, using interest rate swaps, caps, collars, or similar
option products. In such instances, the real estate loan is also secured by a
deed of trust on the same real property that supports the derivatives
exposure, and such loan is typically extended by the dealer (or one of its
affiliates) that is providing the swap or other hedge product. A second,
increasingly common scenario occurs when a commercial or industrial
borrower having debt outstanding to one or more lenders, secured by all or
substantially all of its assets, wishes to enter into derivatives trades,
frequently with one or more members of its lender group. These trades may
be secured, perhaps on a subordinated basis to the loans, by all or
substantially all of the assets of the borrower, including real estate.6
1860 as a precursor to section 726 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. See Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank
v. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d 991, 997 n.5 (1990); 1860 Cal. Stat. ch. 314, § 23, pp. 303-304. The U.S.
Bankruptcy Code definition of "swap agreement" contains an extensive and functional listing of
financial derivatives. II U.S.C. § 101(53B) (2006).
4. End-users include business, governmental, and fund entities of various kinds. During the period
from 1998 through 2001, some 60 percent of all over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives were entered into
by end-users. CIRO, supra note 2, at 16.
5. The most common method of collateralizing obligations under the ISDA Master Agreement is
using the ISDA Credit Support Annex ("CSA"). INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES
ASSOCIATION, INC., ISDA CREDIT SUPPORT ANEX (1994), available at http://www.isda.org (follow
"Bookstore/Publications" hyperlink, then follow "ISDA Credit Support Documentation" hyperlink).
The CSA typically accommodates the provision of cash, treasury notes and similar instruments on a
periodic, "mark-to-market" basis, but can also be modified to accept other forms of eligible collateral,
including real estate.
6. A variety of documentation and other issues are encountered when combining loans and
derivatives in a single credit or collateral structure. See, e.g., Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1042-44 (9th Cir. 2003) (addressing characterization of swap
settlement payment in combined swap/loan arrangement). See generally Christian Johnson, At the
Intersection of Bank Finance and Derivatives: "ho Has the Right of Way?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1998);
Mark Guinn & William Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as Collateral, 57 BuS. LAW. 1127
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The decision by any creditor to accept California real estate collateral
always introduces a host of potential issues and concerns, including (i) the
effect of California's one-action rule,7 which restricts the creditor to a
single (judicial) action, (ii) the effect of California's anti-deficiency rules,8
which (among other things) bar actions to collect deficiencies following
non-judicial foreclosures and foreclosures on certain purchase money liens,
(iii) the choice between non-judicial and judicial foreclosure processes (the
former being generally quicker, but involving a deficiency bar; the latter
not having a deficiency bar, but entailing a post-foreclosure right of
redemption),9 (iv) the possible effect of the debtor's right of reinstatement
following acceleration and prior to foreclosure, ° and other matters.
In addition to raising all the issues described above, securing
derivatives obligations with California real estate raises several other
unique derivatives-related concerns that result from the characteristics of
derivatives and their documentation. This article addresses several of these
issues, all of which a financial institution counterparty (referred to herein as
the "derivatives creditor") should consider before accepting California real
estate as collateral for derivatives obligations." It first addresses the issues
of whether close-out netting under a master agreement such as the ISDA
Master Agreement contravenes the "security-first" rule of section 726 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure, and whether the debtor's statutory
right of reinstatement, which applies in respect of judicial and non-judicial
foreclosures, would permit a defaulting derivatives debtor to reinstate
closed-out derivatives trades. The article then discusses the priority of
intervening liens and their effect on the ability of a real estate-secured
derivatives creditor to effectuate close-out netting under certain scenarios.
The article also considers how to avoid inadvertently triggering the anti-
deficiency bar due to excessive derivatives exposure secured by California
real estate.
In addition to describing the issues and how a court of first impression
may approach them, this article also offers suggested techniques for
mitigating the legal risks raised. It begins, however, with a brief overview
of derivative contracts. 2
(2002).
7. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 2007).
8. Id. at §§ 580d (barring deficiency judgment after non-judicial foreclosure), 580b (barring
deficiency judgment under purchase money liens). See also id. at § 580a (demonstrating fair value
limitation upon judicial foreclosure).
9. See generally BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 2.8.
10. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924c (West 2007).
11. For purposes of this article, unless otherwise specified, the derivatives dealer will be assumed to
be the "derivatives creditor" and the corporate end-user the "derivatives debtor." In actuality, of course,
either side could end up in the creditor or debtor position with regard to a given set of trades, depending
on the applicable Close-out Amounts.
12. For a more extensive introduction to derivatives contracts and their issues, see generally Guinn
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II. DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS GENERALLY
Financial derivatives are commonly defined as financial instruments
that derive their value from changes in value of some underlying asset, rate,
or index. 3 Derivatives may be simple or complex and may be constructed
of any of several components, including swaps, forwards, and options. 4
They usually involve a form of net settlement. While certain derivatives
may be traded over established exchanges, this article addresses derivatives
that are entered into on an over-the-counter (OTC) basis between two
counterparties-typically an end-user wishing to mitigate or reallocate
some asset, liability, or other risk, and a dealer, the latter most commonly
being a commercial or investment bank or similar entity. 5
Derivative contracts are executory contracts as to which either party or
both parties may owe further performance at any given point in time, which
performance may be in the form of payment or delivery obligations. 6 In
addition, because their values vary continuously, dependent upon changes
in the value or amount of the underlying asset, rate, or index, derivative
contracts may be "in" or "out" of the money as to any given counterparty at
any particular point in time. 7 Thus, a derivative may either be an asset or a
liability of a given counterparty at any time of determination. The credit
risk associated with derivatives, therefore, has two main components-
(i) whether the derivative contract is "in" or "out" of the money as to the
subject counterparty at the time of default or other enforcement (i.e., the
market risk), and (ii) if such counterparty is "out of the money," whether
& Harvey, supra note 6; Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and their
Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1 (1996); GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 2, 63-128.
13. Such underlying asset, rate, or index is referred to as "the underlying." Derivatives are fashioned
based on "notional amounts," which are the theoretical, indicated number or quantity to which the
underlying is applied. See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK, RISK MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, 1 (1994). A
counterparty that is "in the money" is owed payment or delivery; one that is "out of the money" owes it
to the other counterparty.
14. See generally Guinn & Harvey, supra note 6, at 1128-32.
15. Exchange-traded derivatives, such as futures, tend to be less customized than OTC derivatives.
However, the standardized aspect of such contracts facilitates their prompt and efficient sale. For a
discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of exchange-traded versus OTC derivatives, see
GOOCH & KLEIN, supra note 2, at 4. See generally Rhett Campbell, Energy Future and Forward
Contracts, Safe Harbors and the Bankruptcy Code, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2004).
16. Most derivatives trades provide for payments in cash and are subject to cash settlement. Certain
commodity derivatives may provide for the actual physical delivery of the underlying. Certain credit
derivatives provide for the delivery of specified loan or bond documentation upon settlement, also
deemed physical settlement.
17. The determination of the value of a derivative, or a group of derivatives, at any point in time
prior to settlement is called "marking to market." See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, BANKING ISSUANCE BC-277, at 13 (October 27, 1993) [hereinafter BC-277], available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bc/bc-277.doc. A counterparty that is "in the money" is owed payment or
delivery; one that is "out of the money" owes it to the other counterparty.
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such counterparty has the credit capacity to perform (counterparty risk). 8
Credit support in the form of collateral or third party guaranties may be
demanded by either or both counterparties at the outset of the relationship,
or thereafter, if there exists uncertainty as to the ability of the other
counterparty to perform in accordance with the terms of the derivatives
contracts. 19
Typically, the dealer in a derivatives trade will hedge the market risk
associated with its derivatives contracts, either on a trade-specific, "back-
to-back" basis (matched trading), or on a general portfolio basis, using any
of a variety of instruments and strategies. Although the dealer's
counterparty may not be aware of whether or how the dealer is hedging its
position, it does potentially benefit from such hedging through more
favorable trade pricing, and any Close-out Amount payable by such party
may include a component for the costs of terminating such hedging
transactions or arrangements.2°
OTC derivatives are most commonly entered into under standard
documentation promulgated by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association ("ISDA"). The ISDA document architecture includes several
elements, but most importantly, together these elements constitute a single
master agreement (the "ISDA Master Agreement").2 Any number of
separate derivative transactions may be undertaken between the -given
counterparties under their master agreement, each transaction being
evidenced by a separate confirmation entered into on or shortly after the
completion of the trade. Although a standard document, the ISDA Master
Agreement may be customized through a schedule ("ISDA Schedule") that
is executed and delivered by the parties, usually prior to or
contemporaneously with the undertaking of the initial trade.22 Further
18. Other risks affecting performance under derivatives contracts includes documentation risk, legal
or regulatory risk and operational risk. See id. Certain options-based derivatives are pre-paid by the
purchaser, leaving only the seller with a contingent obligation to perform in the future. Such trades
entail credit risk being incurred only by the purchaser (usually the end-user) in respect of the seller
(usually the dealer).
19. See supra note 5.
20. See INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT,
§ 14 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Master Agreement] (defining "Close-out Amount"), available at
www.isda.org (follow "Bookstore/Publications" hyperlink). Cf INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., 1992 MASTER AGREEMENT, § 14 (1992) (defining "Loss" and
"Settlement Amount"); In re Spiegel, Inc., No. 03-11540, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 289, at I (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. February 18, 2005) (holding under specific facts that lender may not receive as additional
damages on account of its loan claim losses due to early termination of lender's hedging arrangement).
2 1. There are currently two versions of the ISDA Master Agreement in widespread usage-the 1992
Master Agreement (Multicurrency-Cross-Border) and the 2002 Master Agreement, see sources cited
supra note 20. Unless otherwise specified, references in this article to the ISDA Master Agreement will
be to the 2002 Master Agreement, and capitalized terms not otherwise defined have the definitions
specified in the 2002 Master Agreement.
22. The ISDA schedule comes as an attachment to the 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20.
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customization occurs at the level of each confirmation. All derivatives
trades and their respective confirmations under an ISDA Master Agreement
are together deemed to compose a single agreement. 3 This unification
principle has been recognized and upheld by Congress and certain state
legislatures and has been cited as being critical in order to avoid piecemeal
rejection of selected derivatives trades in a counterparty insolvency, i.e.,
"cherry-picking," and interference with the close-out process.24 Avoiding
such cherry-picking, and ensuring a timely ability to close-out derivatives
trades notwithstanding counterparty insolvency, are in turn perceived as
vital elements of a policy of reducing systemic risk within the banking
system and financial markets.25
Derivatives trades may have tenors ranging from a few months to
twenty years or more, during which time either or both counterparties may
be obligated to make one or more payments or deliveries of designated
assets.26 The derivatives trades collectively are subject to early termination
if any of certain events occurs. Such events include (i) events of default,
which in the ISDA Master Agreement generally resemble loan agreement
events of default,27 and (ii) "Termination Events,"28 which are generally
Particularly where the parties do not contemplate entering into successive transactions with each other,
they may elect not to enter into an ISDA Master Agreement and ISDA Schedule, relying instead on a
long-form confirmation. However, oftentimes the confirmation will incorporate by reference the ISDA
Master Agreement and ISDA standard definitions.
23. See 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, § 1(c) (citing single agreement provision).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 125 (2005) ("unified treatment is fundamental to the reduction of
systemic risk"), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 186; 12 U.S.C. § 4401 (2000) (recognizing that,
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), 12 U.S.C. §
1181 (2000), the stated purpose of protecting "netting contracts" is to "reduce the systemic risk within
the banking system and financial markets"); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(vii) (2000) (treating master
agreement together with all supplements as "one swap agreement"). See also N.Y. BANKING LAW § 606
(Consol. 2006) (recognizing that any master agreement for "qualified financial contracts" (which term
includes derivatives) together with all trades and supplements, "shall be treated as one qualified
financial contract"). See also S. REP. No. 10 1-285 (1990) ("The immediate termination for default and
the netting provisions are critical aspects of swap transactions and are necessary for the protection of all
parties in light of the potential for rapid changes in the financial markets.").
25. See sources cited supra note 24.
26. Interest rate swaps entered into in conjunction with real estate loans often have the same tenor as
such loans, which may be seven to thirty years. Such lengthy tenors will tend to exacerbate the mark-to-
market value impact of changes in the underlying interest rate, resulting in greater price volatility and
potentially larger claims upon an Early Termination Date.
27. Such events of default include (i) failure to pay or deliver, (ii) breach of covenant, and
repudiation of agreement, (iii) default under credit support documentation (such as the CSA, deeds of
trust and security agreements), (iv) misrepresentation, (v) default under Specified Transactions (i.e.,
other derivatives not falling under such ISDA Master Agreement), (vi) cross-default, (vii) bankruptcy
and insolvency, and (viii) merger by counterparty without assumption. 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT,
supra note 20, § 5(a).
28. The ISDA Termination Events include (i) illegality of any transaction, (ii)force majeure events,
(iii) certain tax events (including action by taxing authorities and change in tax law), (iv) additional tax
amounts required to be paid upon merger of a counterparty, (v) Credit Event Upon Merger (the merger
of a counterparty resulting in lessened creditworthiness), and (vi) any Additional Termination Event
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"no-fault" events or circumstances, such as illegality, tax changes, force
majeure, and certain mergers involving a counterparty, that the parties have
agreed are sufficiently material to permit the early termination of some or
all outstanding trades. Following an event of default, the Non-defaulting
Party may elect to declare an Early Termination Date, thereby terminating
all outstanding derivatives trades under the ISDA Master Agreement.29
Upon a Termination Event, any designated party may elect to declare an
Early Termination Date and terminate certain or all (depending on the
nature of the Termination Event) outstanding trades under the ISDA Master
Agreement.3" In either event, upon the Early Termination Date, no further
scheduled payments or deliveries are required and the termination value of
each affected trade is determined, based upon a methodology agreed to by
the parties in the ISDA Schedule (the "Close-out Amount").3 Assuming
multiple trades exist, the result is reduced to a single positive (in the
money) or negative (out of the money) number through a process known as
"close-out netting" and certain other amounts are added to create the "Early
Termination Amount. 32 This number then becomes the basis for a claim by
the derivatives creditor against the derivatives debtor, which in turn
potentially allows the former to proceed against the latter's collateral. The
balance of this article addresses certain issues that may arise when the
derivatives creditor has taken and wishes to proceed against California real
estate collateral.
III. CLOSE-OUT NETTING AND THE "SECURITY-FIRST" PROBLEM
Close-out netting may be susceptible to differing legal
characterizations. Insofar as the ISDA Master Agreement specifies that all
trades arising under it are deemed to constitute a single agreement and
specifies the method of calculating the Early Termination Amount for such
trades, close-out netting is best viewed as simply the mathematical means
by which a lump-sum amount (the Early Termination Amount) associated
with that ISDA Master Agreement (including all of its constituent
confirmations) is determined.33 However, since close-out netting involves
specified in the ISDA Schedule or any confirmation. 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, § 5(b).
29. 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, § 6(a).
30. Id. at § 6(b)(iv).
31. Id. at §§ 6(c)(ii), (e).
32. Id. at § 6(e). For close-out netting to be useful when most needed (i.e., during the bankruptcy or
insolvency of the defaulting counterparty), the applicable bankruptcy laws must (i) permit the Non-
defaulting Party to close-out and net the derivatives and (ii) not permit the bankruptcy trustee (or
similar official) to block close-out netting and "cherry pick" "in the money" positions while repudiating
"out of the money" positions. Fortunately, the United States Bankruptcy Code does provide these
protections to derivatives counterparties. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. §§ 362, 560, 561 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
33. See 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, at §§ 6(c)(ii), (e). The federal banking laws (e.g.,
FDICIA) use the term "netting contracts," which is defined as a contract between two or more financial
institutions that "provides for netting present or future payment obligations or payment entitlements
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the addition and subtraction of amounts owing by each side to the other on
trades that may in some sense be deemed separate, it may also be argued
that it is a form of set-off.34 Due to a line of cases decided under California
law,35 this latter possibility has raised a concern with some practitioners
that such close-out netting may violate the "security-first" aspect of Section
726 of the California Code of Civil Procedure.36 If this were to be the case,
as discussed below, the derivatives creditor might be unable to use close-
out netting without risking the loss of its California real estate collateral.
The security-first doctrine is a case law-derived outgrowth of
California's statutory one-action rule.37 The latter, which proceeds from
statutory language in section 726, directs that "[t]here can be but one form
of action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured by a mortgage upon real property .... ,,38 The term "action" is
defined statutorily as a judicial action.39 Thus, the one-action rule does not
proscribe non-judicial enforcement steps, such as non-judicial foreclosure
of real or personal property collateral. However, as early as the nineteenth
century,4" California judges discerned in the one-action rule an implicit
prohibition against seizing, even without the use of judicial means,
unencumbered assets of the debtor and applying those assets to the real
estate-secured indebtedness.41 This implicit prohibition, which has come to
be known as the "security-first" rule, requires that the secured creditor
proceed first against the real estate collateral.42
(including liquidation or close-out values relating to the obligations or entitlements) among the parties
to the agreement ... " 12 U.S.C. § 4402(14) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
34. Federal legislation adopted to preserve close-out netting in various insolvency contexts generally
uses alternative language, such as "offset or net out any termination value." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(A)
(2000); 11 U.S.C. § 560 (2000). The use of such language may suggest some uncertainty as to the
correct characterization of close-out netting, or it may suggest that netting may indeed be distinct from
set-off. Under California law, set-off is based on equitable principles (and so, often termed "equitable
set-off') that permit either party to a transaction involving mutual debts and credits to pay or receive
only the net difference. See Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, II Cal.3d 352, 363 (1974). See generally 16
CAL. JUR. 3D §§ 6, 7 (2002) ("Counterclaim and Setoff'). Cf In re California Canners and Growers, 62
B.R. 18, 19 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (distinguishing between set-off and recoupment for purposes of
determining bankruptcy claim amounts).
35. See, e.g., Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d 991, 1015 (1990) (holding that, while
extrajudicial set-off of debtor's deposit account did not constitute an "action" for purposes of section
726, it did contravene the security-first rule); McKean v. German-Am. Savs. Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 341
(1897) (holding set-off against deposited funds of the debtor, against the consent of mortgagor, violated
security-first principle); Bank of Am. v. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 773 (1984) (holding set-off is an
"action" for purposes of section 726); Aplanalp v. Forte, 225 Cal. App. 3d 609, 613-614 (1990).
36. CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 2007).
37. See Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 999-1000.
38. § 726(a).
39. Id. at § 22.
40. See McKean, 118 Cal. at 339-40.
41. See discussion in Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 999.
42. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at §§ 4.1 et seq. Procedurally, the security-first rule may be
[Vol. 3:2
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Applying the one-action or security-first rule, California courts have
held that a real estate-secured creditor cannot set-off against general
deposit accounts of the debtor maintained with such secured party and
apply such funds to the secured indebtedness.43 Under the ruling of Bank of
America v. Daily, such set-off was deemed an "action" for purposes of
section 726.44 The later Wozab decision overruled that determination, but
concluded that deposit account set-off contravened the security-first
principle.45 Under Wozab, the remedy for such violation was stated to be
forfeiture of the real estate collateral.46
The set-off cases decided under section 726 have generally involved
deposit account set-offs. 47 The notable exception is Aplanalp v. Forte, in
which a California Court of Appeal applied the Daily holding to conclude
in a non-deposit account context that the exercise of an equitable set-off
(arising from a judgment rendered against it in an independent matter) by a
real estate-secured noteholder prior to conducting a non-judicial
foreclosure sale violated the one-action rule.48 The court noted, in dictum,
that where a real estate-secured creditor is sued by its borrower (even in an
unrelated matter), its ability to assert a cross-complaint based on its secured
note is subject to section 726.4' However, the Aplanalp case may be
invoked by the debtor as an affirmative defense or as an affirmative sanction. See, e.g., R. BERNHARDT,
supra note 3, at § 4.11.
43. See, e.g., Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d at 991.
44. See Bank of Am. v. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 771-72 (1984)
45. See Wozab, 51 Cal.3d at 999 n.7. The Wozab court premised its holding on the following policy
basis:
By exercising such a setoff, a bank not only deprives the debtor of the immediate possession
of funds to which the debtor is then entitled, but the bank may obtain funds of the debtor to
which the bank would never be entitled or to which other creditors have an equal or greater
claim. If, for example, the market value of the security equals or exceeds the debt or if any of
the statutory provisions prohibiting a deficiency judgment are applicable, the bank would
have no right to reach any assets of the debtor other than the security (§§ 726, subd. (b),
580b, 580d), but the bank could evade these limitations with impunity if it could collect the
secured debt by setoff from a debtor's nonsecured bank account.
Id. at 1010.
46. Id. Under certain aggravated circumstances the creditor may also be deemed to forfeit its claim
for repayment of the debt. Id. at 1006. See generally Darren Conley, Comment: The Sanction for
Violation of California's One-Action Rule, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1601 (1991).
47. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 35. There is, in addition, a case involving equitable set-off of
(non-deposit) claims, decided under section 580b of the California Code of Civil Procedure, in which
the court held that the set-off by a creditor of amounts it owed to the debtor in relation to a prior
dispute, against a deficiency remaining after completion of the non-judicial foreclosure of a purchase
money deed of trust, violated the spirit of section 580b and was therefore impermissible. See Birman v.
Loeb, 64 Cal. App. 4th 502, 522 (1998). The court noted that the case did not arise under section 726's
security-first rule, because the set-off was undertaken after completion of foreclosure on the real estate.
Id. at 508 n.2. It reasoned that allowing such set-off would in effect provide the creditor with a second
source of repayment, apart from the foreclosure proceeds, and that this was contrary to section 580b's
purpose, i.e., placing the risk of inadequate security on the purchase money mortgagee. Id. at 513.
48. Aplanalp v. Forte, 225 Cal. App. 3d 609, 614 (1990).
49. See id. at 616 n.46.
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distinguished in that the set-off was preceded by a court order authorizing
the set-off, which court order was cited as an additional basis for the
existence of an "action" for section 726 purposes. It also relies upon an
aspect of Daily that was later overruled by the Wozab decision.5"
Consequently, apart from the fact that Aplanalp was decided by a lower
appeals court, its current force and applicability is open to debate.
As a counter-point to the set-off line of authority under section 726,
there are cases involving additional grants or pledges of security by the
debtor to the real estate-secured creditor. In such situations, the California
courts have repeatedly held that section 726 does not prohibit the secured
party from enforcing such pledges non-judicially, even to the point of
foreclosure." This principle has also been extended to situations where the
secured party holds a letter of credit issued for the debtor's account by a
third party institution."
It is suggested that in the foregoing lines of cases, a differentiating
principle between the additional collateral-type instances on the one hand,
and the deposit account set-off line of authority (as well as Aplanalp's non-
consensual equitable set-off) on the other, is that in the former the debtor
has voluntarily conveyed certain property and rights to the secured party,
which rights are simply exercised by the secured party in accordance with
the agreed contractual provisions. 3 Unilateral set-off against deposit
accounts and similar property, however, is generally viewed as a
non-consensual remedy.
There exists no case law precedent interpreting derivatives close-out
netting in the context of section 726. As noted above, the most appropriate
characterization of close-out netting is that it is simply a mathematical
means of calculating the Early Termination Amount within the context of a
single agreement and does not involve set-off at all. However, to the extent
a court should determine that close-out netting is a type of set-off, it should
nevertheless hold that such netting does not contravene the security-first
rule. Close-out netting is explicitly provided for in the ISDA Master
Agreement and is therefore voluntarily agreed-to by both parties, and it
may benefit either party depending on the nature of the trades and the
relative market values of the underlyings. It is therefore more analogous to
a voluntary pledge, rather than an involuntary set-off, for purposes of the
50. See id. at 615 n.18; Wozab, 51 Cal.3d at 999 n.7.
51. See, e.g., RTC v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1243 (9th Cir. 1994) (multiple real estate
collateral); In re Kearns, 314 B.R. 819, 826 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (mixed collateral); In re Sunnymead
Shopping Center Co., 178 BR. 809, 817 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (payments from cash collateral); RTC
v. Bayside Developers, 817 F. Supp. 822, 828-29 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (mixed collateral); In re 500
Ygnacio Associates, Ltd., 141 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992).
52. See 1111 Prospect Partners v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 4th 185, 197 (1995).
53. See sources cited supra notes 50 and 51.
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security-first rule. In addition, as simply the means by which the
derivatives creditor's claim is calculated, close-out netting is not a remedy,
unlike deposit account set-off. Moreover, it is not the seizure of
unencumbered assets of the derivatives debtor by the derivatives creditor,
nor does it facilitate the circumvention of the debtor protections in the one-
action or anti-deficiency rules or deprive the debtor of the ability to litigate
and protect its interests.54 Indeed, close-out netting, by reducing several
potential claims to a single one, actually supports the underlying principle
of the one-action rule-that of avoiding a multiplicity of actions.
Beyond the foregoing considerations that there is no need to extend
Wozab and its related cases to interfere with close-out netting, doing so
would create an inequitable result and undermine important policies and
practices that are central to the derivatives markets. As noted above, it is
only by application of close-out netting that a derivatives creditor is able,
under the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement, to arrive at the Early
Termination Amount, i.e., to fix its claim against the derivatives debtor.55
Therefore, a holding that close-out netting contravenes the security-first
rule would place the derivatives creditor in the undesirable position of
either surrendering its real estate collateral or foregoing the liquidation of
its claim. In the case of the latter, the derivatives creditor would also be
unable to pursue other remedies, such as non-judicial foreclosure on
personal property collateral, even though such remedies would themselves
be permitted by the one-action rule--clearly an inequitable result.56 Perhaps
most importantly, blocking or disenabling close-out netting runs contrary to
certain fundamental financial policies, such as the mitigation of systemic
risk, that have been cited repeatedly by Congress in adopting special
bankruptcy and bank insolvency legislation relating to derivatives.57
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments supporting the proposition
that close-out netting should not be held to contravene the security-first rule
of section 726, given the absence of dispositive California case law
authority on the subject, real estate-secured derivatives creditors may wish
to consider obtaining a security interest under the Uniform Commercial
Code in all of the derivatives debtor's rights under derivative contracts
under the ISDA Master Agreement (including those with such derivatives
creditor) and then foreclose on such rights in accordance with the UCC.5"
As noted above, non-judicial foreclosure in respect of other collateral
54. Cf Wozab, 51 Cal.3d at 1002 n.3.
55. See supra text accompanying note 31.
56. See, e.g., Machado v. Borges, 170 Cal. 501, 503 (1915) (demonstrating court of equity will
compel set-off where such set-off is necessary to enable party to collect on claim).
57. See supra text accompanying note 22-23. See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-31, supra note 23.
See also, 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(17), 560 (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 4401(2000).
58. See generally, Guinn & Harvey, supra note 6.
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provided by the debtor does not contravene either the security-first or one-
action rule.59
There exists a second set-off-related issue under the security-first rule,
which raises perhaps a more problematic scenario for derivatives
counterparties. Section 6(f) of the ISDA Master Agreement permits a
derivatives counterparty that is the Non-defaulting Party to offset any Early
Termination Amount that it owes the Defaulting Party against any other
amount owed to it by such Defaulting Party.60 A common instance of this
relevant to the present context would be the case where the Non-defaulting
Party has extended a real estate loan to the Defaulting Party and also
entered into an interest rate swap, and the Non-defaulting Party is out-of-
the-money on the swap at the time of acceleration of the loan and the
declaration of the Early Termination Date. The issue again is whether such
set-off by the Non-defaulting Party against the loan balance contravenes
the security-first rule. Here, the loan/derivative set-off is not part of close-
out netting, is clearly a type of equitable set-off, and does not implicate the
significant policy concerns referenced above protecting close-out netting. It
would appear likely that Aplanalp, to the extent it is still good and
persuasive authority, would be cited as a basis to block such set-off.6 ' For
this reason, lenders who are real estate-secured derivatives creditors may
again wish to mitigate their risk by obtaining a perfected UCC security
interest in the debtor's "in the money" derivatives claims against the former
as additional security for the real estate loan.62
IV. THE DEBTOR'S RIGHT OF REINSTATEMENT AS APPLIED TO
DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS
A second area of potential concern when applying California's real
property security laws to derivatives obligations arises under the statutory
right of reinstatement afforded by section 2924c of California Civil Code.63
This section, which applies in the context of both judicial and non-judicial
foreclosures, provides debtors a right to de-accelerate and reinstate an
obligation secured by California real estate that has become due and
payable as a result of a payment default, assuming all amounts in default
(without taking into account the accelerated amount), plus so-called
"recurring obligations," are paid.' This right may be exercised by the
59. SeeRTC v. Bayside Developers, 43 F.3d 1230, 1243 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Kearns, 314 B.R. 819,
826 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004); In re Sunnymead Shopping Center Co., 178 BR. 809, 817 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1995); RTC v. Bayside Developers, 817 F. Supp. 822, 828-29 (N.D. Cal. 1993); In re 500 Ygnacio
Associates, Ltd., 141 B.R. 191, 192 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992)
60. 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, § 6(), at 14.
61. See text accompanying notes 48-50, supra.
62. See generally M. Guinn & W. Harvey, supra note 6.
63. CAL. CiV. CODE § 2924c (West 2007).
64. [d. at § 2924c(a)(1). Section 2924c specifies that the debtor wishing to cure and reinstate its
[Vol. 3:2
SECURING DERIVATIVES OBLIGATIONS
debtor at any time prior to five business days before the date of foreclosure
sale specified in the notice of foreclosure, in the case of foreclosure by
power of sale, or any time prior to the entry of the decree of foreclosure, in
the case of judicial foreclosure.65 The specific issue is whether section
2924c permits a derivatives debtor that has defaulted on an interim
payment obligation to reinstate derivatives trades that were subsequently
closed out by its counterparty pursuant to the close-out netting process.
It is not entirely clear from the face of the statute whether section
2924c was intended to extend to any obligation secured by a deed of trust,
or only to loans and certain loan-equivalent obligations.66 The terminology
applied to derivatives does not fit comfortably within section 2924c's
statutory language. For example, derivatives are not "declared due" (i.e.,
accelerated) following a default or Termination Event. Instead, they are
terminated or closed-out, with a single Early Termination Amount being
determined as of the Early Determination Date through close-out netting.6
obligations shall pay the entire amount due, at the time payment is tendered, with respect to:
(A) all amounts of principal, interest, taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, or advances
actually known by the beneficiary to be, and that are, in default and shown in the notice of
default,... (B) all amounts in default in recurring obligations not shown in the notice of
default, and (C) all reasonable costs and expenses ....
Id. "Recurring obligations" is defined as:
all amounts of principal and interest on the loan, or rents, subject to the deed of trust or
mortgage in default due after the notice of default is recorded; all amounts of principal and
interest or rents advanced on senior liens or leaseholds which are advanced after the
recordation of the notice of default; and payments of taxes, assessments, and hazard
insurance advanced after recordation of the notice of default.
Id.
65. Id. at § 2924c(e).
66. The lack of clarity as to whether section 2924c is intended to apply only in respect of loan (and
similar) obligations, or more broadly, appears in the following excerpts from section 2924c :
Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by deed of trust or
mortgage on real property... has, prior to the maturity date fixed in that obligation, become
due or then declared due by reason of default in payment of interest or of any installment of
principal, or by reason of failure of trustor ... to pay, in accordance with the terms of that
obligation or the deed of trust or mortgage, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or
advances made by beneficiary ... in accordance with the terms of that obligation ....
Id. at § 2924c(a)(1) (emphasis added). "[T]he term 'recurring obligation' means all amounts of
principal and interest on the loan, or rents, subject to the deed of trust or mortgage .... Id. Moreover,
section 2924c provides that the notice of any default described in that section and recorded shall be
mailed to the obligor and include the following language (inter alia):
While your property is in foreclosure, you still must pay other obligations (such as insurance
and taxes) required by your note and deed of trust or mortgage. If you fail to make future
payments on the loan, pay taxes on the property, provide insurance on the property, or pay
other obligations as required in the note and deed of trust or mortgage, the beneficiary or
mortgagee may insist that you do so in order to reinstate your account in good standing.
Id. § 2924c(b)(1).
67. See 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, § 6, at 11. Similarly, derivatives payments are
not typically characterized as being in the nature of "principal," or "interest" (other than interest in
respect of past-due payments), nor do they have a "maturity date," nor do they involve a "note."
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The application of section 2924c in the context of real estate-secured
loans is relatively straightforward and generally understood. However, its
application in the context of derivatives obligations raises issues that have
not been addressed by case law. First, the application of section 2924c
could impose unusual and seemingly inequitable burdens on the real estate-
secured derivatives creditor. If the derivatives creditor has hedged its
market risk associated with the derivatives transactions through "back-to-
back" transactions, it will typically have closed out those hedging
transactions, effective on the Early Termination Date under the ISDA
Master Agreement. If section 2924c should be deemed applicable to
derivatives obligations, it would permit the debtor, after the declaration of
an event of default (due to a missed payment) under the ISDA Master
Agreement and the termination of all trades and the calculation of the
requisite Early Termination Amount, to remit whatever payment amount
may have precipitated the initial default and thereby reinstate all terminated
trades. Such action would, among other things, potentially leave the dealer
in an unhedged position, significantly altering the economics and risks of
the transaction to that dealer.68 Furthermore, absent special language added
to the Schedule of the ISDA Master Agreement to address this eventuality,
the derivatives debtor would probably not be responsible for defraying the
cost of the reinstatement of the dealer's hedge under these circumstances.69
Second, if applied in this context, section 2924c would appear to
extend inequitable and unbargained-for benefits to the derivatives debtor.
The effect of applying section 2924c to derivatives trades would be to
provide the debtor with an option, of potentially considerable value, to
reinstate its trades as of a date more than three months following their
termination.70 In other words, the debtor could elect to forego exercising
this option if, during the interim, the net value of the derivative contracts
dropped, while deciding to exercise the right if the net value of the
derivatives significantly increased. Given the pricing volatility of many
derivatives, the value swings could be considerable.71 Such optionality goes
68. During this period of time, the value of the various Close-out Amounts could shift dramatically,
perhaps in a manner opposite to the dealer, transforming what was initially an "in the money" position
as to the dealer to one that is "out of the money." If the dealer has meanwhile terminated its hedge, and
the derivatives debtor successfully reinstates its trades, the dealer will be exposed to a potentially
significant loss. However, if the dealer retains its original hedges in place following the Early
Termination Date of the underlying trade and the underlying trade is not reinstated, the dealer is again
in an exposed or unhedged position, this time vis-d-vis its back-to-back transactions.
69. See 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, § 14, at 21 (defining "Close-out Amount").
70. Pursuant to section 2924c, at least three months must elapse, to allow possible exercise of the
debtor's right of reinstatement, before the (twenty day) notice of sale may be issued. § 2924c.
Frequently, more time than this is given. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at § 2.44. With judicial
foreclosures, a considerably longer time may elapse until actual completion of the foreclosure. See id. at
§ 2.8.
71. As noted above supra note 26, long-dated derivatives, such as are often used to hedge real
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considerably beyond any notion of merely restoring the status quo ante;
there is nothing in the case law addressing section 2924c that would
support granting such a windfall benefit to a defaulted derivatives debtor.72
The foregoing considerations, together with the repeated references in
section 2924c to "principal," "interest," "note," and other loan-related
terms,73 suggest that, notwithstanding certain other broadly phrased
language contained in the statute, section 2924c's right of reinstatement
should not be extended beyond the loan context to provide a right to
reinstate closed-out derivatives trades. However, until the California courts
decide this issue, real estate-secured derivatives creditors may wish to
consider including certain provisions in the ISDA Schedule to ameliorate
the potential effects of applying section 2924c to closed-out derivatives
trades, 74 perhaps as an amendment to Section 9 of the ISDA Master
Agreement, such'as the following:
(j) Reinstatement. To the maximum extent permitted under applicable
law, the parties each hereby waive any right to reinstate, pursuant to
California Civil Code § 2924c or otherwise, any Transactions as to
which an Early Termination Date has occurred hereunder. If and to the
extent that, notwithstanding the foregoing waiver, it may be determined
that § 2924c permits such reinstatement in connection with any
foreclosure upon California real estate securing the obligations of either
party hereunder, and the Defaulting Party (or Affected Party) properly
elects to reinstate pursuant to § 2924c Transactions as to which an Early
Termination Date has occurred, the Non-defaulting Party (or Non-
affected Party, as the case may be) shall be entitled to replace or
reinstate, with any counterparty of its choosing, any hedging
arrangement or transactions in effect as of such Early Termination Date,
and the costs incurred by the Non-defaulting Party (or Non-affected
Party, as the case may be) in connection with any such replacement or
reinstated hedges shall be deemed advanced by the Non-defaulting Party
(or Non-affected Party, as the case may be) for the account of the
Defaulting Party (or Affected Party, as the case may be), which advance
shall be repaid, together with interest thereon at the Default Rate, on
demand.
It is suggested that the hedge expense be structured as an advance in
order to enhance the likelihood that it fits within section 2924c's "recurring
property loan interest rate risk, can be particularly volatile in their mark-to-market pricing.
72. Cf Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Wozab, 51 Cal. 3d 991, 1005 (1990) (declining to order loss of debt
as remedy for violation of the security-first rule as such an order would be "a gross injustice to the bank
and a corresponding windfall to the Wozabs").
73. See sources quoted supra note 66.
74. Another approach to this issue would be to avoid relying upon payment defaults as the basis for
declaring Early Termination Dates. As indicated above, section 2924c's right of reinstatement is
triggered only by certain, mainly payment, defaults. To the extent that other defaults have arisen,
particularly if they are not susceptible to meaningful cure, section 2924c probably should not apply.
Accord, BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at § 2.34.
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obligations" and should therefore be required to be paid by the Defaulting
Party as part of the reinstatement payment.75
V. THE PRIORITY PROBLEM-FUTURE TRADES AND THE
INTERVENING LIENOR
A further issue applicable to real estate-secured derivatives arises in
the context of lien priorities under California's real estate security laws.
The general priority rule with respect to deeds of trust in California is that
the first in time to record prevails over subsequent lienors.76 However, if a
subsequent creditor arises and records its lien and gives notice of such fact
to a prior real estate-secured creditor, any voluntary, non-committed
advances given by the prior creditor to the debtor after that date will
potentially be subject and subordinate to the lien priority of the advances
made by the subsequent lienor.17 Again, this rule operates reasonably well
in the traditional lending context, but one encounters conceptual problems
in applying it to derivatives subject to a master netting arrangement.
Derivatives trades generally are not undertaken on a pre-committed
basis, so obligations associated with derivatives trades that are entered into
after the date of recordation and notice of a subsequent lien would
potentially be subject to the loan or other obligations of the subsequent
lienor.78 However, although the termination values of any and all trades,
including subsequent trades, would ordinarily be netted upon close-out
netting following an Event of Default to establish the Early Termination
Amount, such interruption of priority might be viewed as dictating a two-
stage close-out netting process. In other words, as a result of the application
of the foregoing future advance priority rule, the derivatives creditor may
find itself obligated first to net out all trades entered into prior to the date
the intervening lienor arises, and second to net out separately all trades
75. See § 2924c(a)(1).
76. See, e.g., Friery v. Sutter Buttes Says. Bank, 61 Cal. App. 4th 869, 878 (1998).
77. See, e.g., Rheem Mfg. Co. v. United States, 57 Cal. 2d 621, 625 (1962); Atkinson v. Foote, 44
Cal. App. 149, 159 (1919); Garcia v. Atmajian, 113 Cal. App. 3d 516, 519-20 (1980). Where interest
rate swaps are entered into with real estate loans, the lender/derivatives creditor may wish to obtain title
insurance, through an interest rate exchange agreement endorsement, confirming that the lien priority of
the swap obligations is the same as that of the loan principal. In such instances the title insurer may
require that the swap obligation be characterized as "additional interest," in effect melding the swap
payment with the loan obligation. Counsel should consider whether such characterization of swap
payments could, together with other facts involved in the transaction, result in close-out payments being
characterized as post-petition interest in the event of a borrower bankruptcy (and therefore potentially
subject to disallowance pursuant to I I U.S.C. § 502(b)(2)), notwithstanding the holding in Thrifty Oil
Co. v. Bank ofAm. Nat ' Trust & Sec. Ass'n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003). The title insurer may
also require proof of a commitment by the lender-counterparty to enter into the swap, where such swap
is not consummated at loan closing.
78. A similar priority issue could arise even in the context of personal property collateral, under U.S.
tax lien laws. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (2000).
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occurring after such date.
Two problems arise with the two-stage netting approach to resolving
this issue. First, the ISDA Master Agreement does not generally
contemplate two-stage netting.79 The Agreement specifies only a single
amount that is owing by the derivatives debtor to the derivatives creditor,
and that is the Early Termination Amount in respect of all trades under
such Agreement.8° Second, the application of a two-stage netting approach
may yield odd or illogical results that in fact may be adverse to the
subsequent lienor, depending on the relative values of the trades being
netted pre- and post-intervening lien. For example, if the derivatives
creditor's pre-intervening lien trades are net positive (in the money) and the
subsequent trades are net negative (out of the money), the application of a
two-stage netting rule would result in a larger Close-out Amount, since it
would not be reduced by the (negative) subsequent trades.8'
As a result of the foregoing considerations, it may be argued that it is
impractical or inappropriate to resolve the future advance priority issue
through two-stage netting. In that event, assuming the post-intervening lien
trades are net positive to the derivatives creditor, the situation may be
analogized to the material modification of the first lien documentation in a
manner prejudicial to the junior lien. While there exists conflicting
authority as to the priority effect of a material modification to senior loan
terms, certain authority supports the proposition that the modification
becomes junior to the second lien, and if that is not practical, the entire
senior lien should become junior to the second lien.82
In the absence of definitive case law guidance in this area, and
particularly in view of the theoretical risk of loss of priority as to the entire
first lien position, real estate-secured derivatives creditors will probably
79. See 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, at § 6. One exception to this general rule arises
in the context of certain bullion trades, where the counterparties may specify matched-pair novation
netting between two particular offices or in respect of certain types of trades. See INTERNATIONAL
SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., 1997 ISDA BULLION DEFINITIONS 10 (1997).
80. 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 20, at § 6. There is, however, at least one other statutory
situation where two-stage netting arises. Under New York's bank insolvency law, the Banking
Superintendent is instructed, in the event of a counter-party foreign bank branch insolvency, to calculate
a global net amount and a local net amount (the latter relating only to trades entered into by the New
York branch) and pay the lesser indicated amount. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 618-a(2)(c) (Consol. 2006).
81. The junior lien creditor could even argue that the future advance priority rule should be applied
in a fashion that results in "cherry-picking"--i.e., that only subsequent trades having a positive (in the
money) value as of the Early Termination Date should be deemed "advances" and so subordinated to
the junior lien creditor's interest, while all negative (out of the money) trades should not be deemed
"advances" and should be used to set-off against or reduce the first lien position. Such an argument, of
course, runs headlong into policy-based counterarguments relating to systemic risk. See sources cited
supra note 23.
82. See Lennar Ne. Partners v. Buice, et al., 49 Cal. App. 4th 1576, 1587 (1996) (citing MILLER &
STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 426 (3d ed. 2000)).
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wish to avoid entering into further derivatives trades after receiving notice
of the recordation of a junior deed of trust, unless a suitable subordination
or intercreditor agreement is entered into between the derivatives creditor
and the junior lien creditor.
83
VI. AVOIDING THE INADVERTENT TRIGGERING OF THE
ANTI-DEFICIENCY BAR
Under one prong of California's anti-deficiency rules, a real estate-
secured creditor is barred from seeking recovery from the debtor for any
deficiency resulting from a non-judicial foreclosure of real estate.84 Since
non-judicial foreclosure is typically the preferred remedy for California real
estate-secured creditors, such creditors will often attempt to limit the
aggregate amount of debt and other obligations secured by their real estate
collateral to an amount that is less than the value likely to be realized from
the foreclosure on all such collateral.85 In the case of real estate-secured
loans, crafting such a limitation is relatively simple and is also generally
effective, since the amount of loans extended by a lender is to a
considerable extent, or entirely, within the lender's control. Due to their
pricing volatility in response to factors beyond the control of derivatives
counterparties, however, derivatives exposures can easily and unexpectedly
cause the aggregate amount of secured obligations to exceed any given
collateral value. This risk is potentially exacerbated where the possibility
exists of multiple derivatives trades under a single master agreement being
secured by the same real estate collateral. If the aggregate Early
Termination Amount, together with all loans and other obligations
similarly secured, should at the time of enforcement exceed the collateral
value, the creditor would be forced either to forego its deficiency claim or
to undergo the delay, expense, and complexity associated with a judicial
foreclosure.
Derivatives creditors can take certain steps in order to mitigate the risk
of such an unanticipated deficiency. The simplest approach is from the
collateral side. The creditor simply ensures that its liens extend to all real
and personal property and assets of the derivatives debtor. In so doing, the
derivatives creditor will be able to proceed non-judicially against, and if
necessary exhaust, all sources of value held by the debtor counterparty.
Any deficiency claim remaining at that point is one that would not in any
event be satisfied or reduced. Where the foregoing approach is not
available, the derivatives creditor may instead proceed from the opposite
83. Appropriate negative pledge covenants should also be included in the ISDA Schedule.
84. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (2007).
85. In addition of course, under various statutes and regulations, regulated banks may be required to
maintain certain loan-to-value ratios in their real estate lending activities. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 34.62
(2006) (citing real estate lending standards for national banks).
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side-by limiting the value or number of derivatives trades to be secured
by the real estate collateral. This entails, first, applying various quantitative
methods to estimate the reasonably anticipated maximum future value of
each trade, and, second, adopting a documentation approach that limits the
derivatives trades that are intended to be secured by the real estate
collateral. The most straightforward approach as to the latter factor is (i) to
recite in the deed of trust that it secures only derivatives arising under a
specific master agreement, and (ii) to include language in the derivatives
confirmations that ensures that only the intended derivatives are subject to
that master agreement. Additional derivatives trades, beyond or in excess
of the group that is intended to be so secured, could be placed under a
separate master agreement. The derivatives creditor may even elect, in
order to enable it to net out on an aggregate, global basis for accounting
and other purposes, to place both such master agreements under an
umbrella, or "master master agreement.,
86
VII. CONCLUSION
California's complex real estate security laws have long presented
challenges to real estate-secured creditors, which have resulted in a deep
and rich body of case law. Nevertheless, derivatives creditors wishing to
use California real estate as collateral must face, without the benefit of
definitive case law guidance, a variety of unique and novel legal issues. It
is anticipated that such case law guidance, when it arrives, will give due
consideration to the special documentation and policy issues surrounding
derivatives and, having done so, conclude that close-out netting does not
contravene section 726's security-first rule, and that section 2924c does not
enable a defaulted derivatives debtor to reinstate closed-out derivatives
trades. In the meantime, derivatives creditors electing to be secured by
California real estate may wish to consider the mitigation techniques
discussed above.
86. Under the second prong of the California anti-deficiency statutes, a residential purchase money
real estate-secured creditor is barred from enforcing any deficiency resulting from either a judicial or
non-judicial foreclosure. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (2007). To date, the use of swaps and other
derivatives in this context is relatively rare.
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